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There exists a nuclear material accountancy gap of 4 or more years
between the fabrication plant output and the reprocessing plant input. The
closing of a material balance in any fuel cycle is of prime interest to
safeguards and nuclear material accountability, both on the domestic and
international level. The reactor is the source and sink of isotopes and
consequently, in closing the material balance it is necessry to tie-in the
input to the reprocessing plant to the reactor operations. There are two
safeguards related questions that are to be addressed in the reprocessing
plant to close the balance: a) What jLs_ the nuclear material content in the
dissolver tank? and b) What should be the nuclear material content in the
dissolver tank? The first question is addressed by the gravimetric method
involving isotopics and/or elemental assay. This is necessary but this is not
sufficient to address the second question. The latter question is addressed
by the isotopics and isotope correlations which relates to the reactor
operations.
In this paper the two questions have been addressed in a comprehensive
manner by the isotope correlation techique (ICT) study at the Argonne National
Laboratory (AHL/ICT program). The results of the program include the following:
(1) Twenty-nine heavy matal isotope correlations, some of which have been
explored by other investigators2~s, were computed for each different fuel
assembly of an operating (Zion-2) PWR using three-dimensional, two-dimensional
and point reactor depletion calculations; the dependence of the computed
correlations on the enrichment and the number of burnable poison rods in the
assembly, and on the method of calculation has been studied (Fig. 1); the
isotope correlations obtained from three-dimensional depletion calculation
have been compared with related and available measured.reprocessing data for
U, Pu isotopes for the Obrigheim PWR of the Federal Republic of Germany6
(Fig. 2); (2) The sensitivity of these isotope correlations to anomalies in
nuclear material flow (e.g., substitution of one unirradiated or natural
uranium assembly for a spent assembly in a six assembly dissolver batch) and
the sensitivity of the correlations to measurement errors of the dissolver
solution isotopic composition have been studied (Fig. 3) and used in selecting
some of the more effective correlations which were incorporated in an algorithm
designed to determine the burnup and initial enrichment of the reprocessing
batch for verification of the reported burnup and initial enrichment and to
verify the internal consistency among the measured isotopic concentrations and
the Pu/U ratio; (3) This cross-correlation algorithm has been programmed and
executed on a completely self-contained portable ICT computer for infield
implementation and assessment. For use after the integrity of the reprocessing
batch has been verified by the cross-correlation algorithm, a modification of
the current gravimetric method for measuring the plutonium and uranium content
in the dissolver or accountancy tank has been obtained.
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Fig. 1. Isotope Correlation No. 12 for Cycle 1 of Zlon 2
for all Axial Segments of All Zone 1 Assemblies
(180 Curves, 3-D 2-Group Calculation)
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Fig. 2. Isotope Correlation No. 3 for Cycle 1 of Zion 2 for all
Assemblies having No BPR, Each Homogenized Over Core
Height £28 Curves, 3-D 2-Group Calculation)
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Fig. 3. Measurement Error (2%) Propagation
